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At first sight a marked difference turns out among the Italian governments of early 
Renaissance: the means of financing their deficit. There are, on the one hand, communal 
cities and republics, raising money from citizens through the system of forced or voluntary 
loans; there are, on the other, princes and lords who exploit services of bankers and 
merchants. These two different systems of borrowing bring about significant financial and 
political aspects. In this paper I will examine the main features characterizing the two 
mechanisms of indebtedness and the implications concerning the emergence of a true 
financial market connected with state bonds. 
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The financing system of governments 
 
At first sight a marked difference turns out among the Italian governments 
of early Renaissance: the means of financing their deficit. There are, on the 
one hand, communal cities and republics, raising money from citizens 
through the system of forced or voluntary loans; there are, on the other, 
princes and lords who exploit services of bankers and merchants. These two 
different systems of borrowing bring about significant financial and political 
aspects. In this paper I will examine the main features characterizing the two 
mechanisms of indebtedness and the implications concerning the emergence 
of a true financial market connected with state bonds. 
As far as we know, in the cities the first loans were on a voluntary 
basis. Pressed by urgent - usually military - needs, the commune requested 
the wealthiest citizens to lend a given sum and committed itself in order to 
pay it back in short time. The social area of lenders was composed of 
merchants, bankers, Jews and sometimes foreigners. The government 
usually granted tax proceeds or domain revenues as guaranty. This practice 
took place beginning from the twelfth century, as the cities seized control of  
taxing rights from feudal lords and ecclesiastical institutions.
1  
The availability of loans, though, was not adequate for the growing 
financial needs of communes, engaged in an expensive territorial expansion. 
Governments thus requested both forced and voluntary loans. The system 
relied on fiscal documents (estimi and catasti) that assessed for all citizens 
the amount of wealth or income. According to these documents, the 
government assigned the amount each citizen had to lend. In this case loans 
usually were short term and with a modest interest rate. This system 
considerably enlarged the social area of lenders; all the citizens, apart from 
the poorest ranks, were requested to put money into the commune’s coffers. 
Likewise, the Jewish community was obliged to lend to the government. 
Although the government debt was characterized by the participation of city 
dwellers, it is nevertheless worth noting that in some cases subject 
communities were involved in the system. In 1287 in Siena, for example, 
the presta generalis (general loan) was imposed on both the capital city and 
the rural communities. In 1371, the same occurred in Lucca. During the 
second half of the fifteenth century, also Venice, albeit seldom, collected 
forced loans from the subject cities. Like the voluntary loans, the forced 
loans were conceived as short-term loans, guaranteed on fiscal revenues that 
also assured interest payments.
2 
                                                 
1 Gino Luzzatto, Le origini dell’organizzazione finanziaria dei comuni italiani (Urbino: QuattroVenti, 
1990), pp. 88 ff.  
I wish to thank Julius Kirshner and Bepi Tattara, who read an earlier version of this paper providing 
me with useful comments.  
2 See, for example, William Bowsky, Le finanze del comune di Siena 1287-1355 (Firenze: La Nuova 
Italia, 1975), pp. 449 ff. (Appendix 12); Duccio Balestracci, La zappa e la retorica. Memorie 
familiari di un contadino toscano del Quattrocento (Siena: Salimbeni, 1984), pp. 144, 147-48; 
Christine Meek, Lucca 1369-1400. Politics and Society in an early Renaissance City-State (Oxford:   3
As far as the signorie, the papal state and the kingdom of Naples are 
concerned, the picture is very different. The mechanism of borrowing first 
relied on the money provided more or less freely from merchants, bankers, 
courtesans, and foreigners. As a consequence, one might paradoxically 
argue that a primary market existed in the princely states, whereas instead a 
‘public’ debt similar to that of the city-states did not exist. It was a very 
peculiar primary market, however, which should be defined more properly 
as a personal market. The lenders to princes usually were merchants and 
bankers whose business in the country were conspicuous. Thus, no wonder 
to see the Strozzi bank heavily involved in managing state finance in 
Aragonese Naples; or the Medici, lending to the duke of Milan. Loans to the 
lord and commercial activities intertwined, constituting a mechanism 
extremely advantageous to lenders as long as the debtor kept his promises.
3 
Along with these people, who can be considered credit specialists, there 
were around the prince also nobles and officers, who wished to get or to 
enhance a political role through lending activity. They willingly lent, 
sometimes even at no interest, counting on princely benevolence in order to 
get privileges, offices and advantages, as in late mediaeval Turin.
4 Such a 
mechanism in some ways recalls the cronyism evocated by Hilton Root with 
regard to ancient regime France.
5 The king stood at the centre of a system of 
relations that, if well exploited, allowed to achieve enormous political and 
economic advantages, but at the same time encouraged a rent seeking 
behaviour. This system, however, called for high costs, due to the great 
uncertainty pervading the relations between creditors and king. The latter, in 
fact, was not bound to any rule and could repudiate his commitments almost 
with no consequences. This sharp asymmetry of course brought about costly 
loans. Therefore it was usual that loans for princes were much dearer than 
those obtained by urban governments. In the mid-fifteenth century, the 
Aragonese crown in Naples, for example, paid interest rate as high as 40%, 
while in Florence interest on short-term loans usually did not exceed 12-
14%.
6 This spread witnessed, among other things, the different degree of 






                                                                                                                            
Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 48; Luciano Pezzolo, Il fisco dei veneziani. Finanza pubblica ed 
economia tra XV e XVII secolo (Verona: Cierre, 2003), pp. 21-22. 
3 Mario Del Treppo, ‘Il re e il banchiere. Strumenti e processi di razionalizzazione dello stato 
aragonese di Napoli’, in G. Rossetti (ed.), Spazio, società, potere nell’Italia dei Comuni (Napoli: 
Liguori, 1986), pp. 269. See also Alan Ryder, ‘Cloth and credit: Aragonese war finance in the mid 
fifteenth century’, War and society, 2 (1984), pp. 1-21. 
4 Alessandro Barbero, Un’oligarchia urbana. Politica ed economia a Torino fra tre e quattrocento 
(Roma: Viella, 1995), pp. 217-18, 231 ff. 
5 Hilton L. Root, The Fountain of Privilege. Political Foundations of Markets in Old Regime France 
and England (Berkeley: University of California press, 1994). 
6 Riley, ‘Cloth and credit’, p. 13; Richard Goldtwaithe, ‘Lorenzo Morelli, Ufficiale del Monte, 1484-
88: interessi privati e cariche pubbliche nella Firenze laurenziana’, Archivio Storico Italiano, 154 
(1996), pp. 613, 617, 630.   4
Funding debt and the emergence of the financial market 
 
Beginning from the second half of the thirteenth century, some urban 
governments recognized it was impossible to return the principal being 
borrowed, and decided to change some elements of their debt. Short-term 
loans were actually transformed in long-term loans; the receipts of some tax 
revenues were assigned for paying interest (5% in Florence and Venice, 7% 
in Genoa, from two to six times a year); all the series were unified in a 
Monte (or compera, in Genoa) and managed by a specific office; 
furthermore, negotiability of state credits was allowed. Venice in 1262 and 
Genoa in 1274 opened the way; by the mid-fourteenth century they were 
followed by Florence, Pisa, Siena, and Lucca.
7 It was not indeed a true 
consolidation, since reimbursements were still undertaken; but undoubtedly 
government creditors abandoned their hope to get their money back. The 
institutionalisation of the debt also brought about an important process of 
socialisation of the debt. By means of middlemen and speculators bonds 
circulated throughout almost all social environments, from the great 
merchants to the humble artisans. It is also worth noting that the resort to 
forced loans pushed governments to improve the tax records. Citizens thus 
became true lender-taxpayers rather than lender-investors.  It is useful to 
stress this aspect, which sheds a particular light on the indebtedness 
mechanism of Italian renaissance cities. A structural change actually 
occurred. As long as state finance was not under severe and extended 
pressure, the system represented a ‘moneylender’s paradise’.
8 Principal was 
paid back in relative short time and interest also was paid regularly. But 
growing and endless expenses provoked huge holes in the budget: thus 
indebtedness became a regular tool, which led almost naturally to funding. 
The pace of indebtedness of the main cities can be seen in Table 1, showing 
the performances of Italian cities in comparison with data concerning the 
European great powers, the latter available only for the mid-seventeenth 
century. 
Table 1. Estimate of per capita indebtedness 1350-1650 
(Kg of silver) 
 
 Venice  Genoa  Florence Holland Castile  France 
         
1350  0.2    0.2     
1400  1.7  2.1  2.8     
1450    3      
1500  4.1  2.7  3.0     
1600  0.1  5.4      
1650  1.7 3.6 0.5 1.7 0.6 0.4 
 
Source: Author’s database. The sources of these data will be presented more extensively in a forthcoming 
monograph. For 1650, James Macdonald, A free nation deep in debt. The financial roots of democracy (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), p. 152. 
                                                 
7 For sake of brevity, see especially Maria Ginatempo, Prima del debito. Finanziamento della spesa 
pubblica e gestione del deficit nelle grandi città toscane (1200-1350 ca.) (Firenze: Olschki, 2001). 
8 Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination. City-States in Renaissance Italy (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1979), p. 175.   5
 
These data confirm how the political and above all the economic power of 
major Italian city-states relied on the exploitation of capital-intensive 
resources, according to the well-known definition of Charles Tilly.
9 It is also 
worth noting that the amount of indebtedness considerably increased, 
despite the demographic crisis of the mid-fourteenth century, due to a long 
period of interstate conflicts. Still, it is surprising that by the mid-
seventeenth century the per capita burden was not lower than the Dutch 
figure, which represented the most developed area in Europe at that time 
and furthermore a recent theater of a long and costly war against the Spanish 
crown. One has however to consider that in Italy the debt was concentrated 
within the single cities, while in other countries it was spread throughout a 
wider area. 
  Undoubtedly the consolidation triggered the development of the 
secondary market of state credits, yet it did not create it. Credits had 
sometimes been circulating before consolidation. In the thirteenth century, 
in Treviso and Vicenza credits were, albeit not often, negotiated; but it is 
likely that this operation was quite exceptional.
10 There are Milanese 
examples of transferring credits of the commune, but these were IOU, which 
did not seem very popular among citizens.
11 The secondary market, though, 
developed as the government demand of loans grew and the 
institutionalization of the debt took place.
12 The formation of a wide 
secondary market made government bankruptcy expectations a matter of 
public discussion.
13 A system, on the one hand, based mainly on personal 
relations between creditors and government allowed the latter to decree a 
selective suspension of payment; a system, on the other hand, based on a 
large secondary market presented the government with a few choices and 
stronger constraints, for a wider public had to be taken into account. This 
does not mean that urban governments did not make any distinction among 
creditors. In 1316, as the Venetian government decided to extinguish a part 
of its debt, creditors of amounts below ten lire were repaid with 70% of their 
principal, whereas 80% was returned to the bondholders of amounts from 
ten to fifteen lire. In Genoa the partecipes grossiores (most important 
shareholders) exercised a certain influence on the government’s financial 
                                                 
9 Charles Tilly, L’oro e la spada. Capitale, guerra e potere nella formazione degli stati europei 990-
1990 (Firenze: Ponte alle Grazie, 1991). 
10 Alfredo Michielin e Gian Maria Varanini, ‘Nota introduttiva’, in Alfredo Michielin (ed.), Mutui e 
risarcimenti del comune di Treviso (secolo XIII) (Roma: Viella, 2003), pp. LXXVII, LXXX; Franco 
Scarmoncin (ed.), I documenti del Comune di Bassano dal 1259 al 1295 (Padova: Antenore, 1989). 
11 Paolo Grillo, ‘L’introduzione dell’estimo e la politica fiscale del comune di Milano alla metà del 
secolo XIII (1240-1260)’, in Patrizia Mainoni (ed.), Politiche finanziarie e fiscali nell’Italia 
settentrionale (secoli XIII-XV) (Milano: Unicopli, 2001), pp. 22-23, 35-36; Gino Barbieri, Origini del 
capitalismo lombardo. Studi e documenti sull’economia milanese del periodo ducale (Milano: 
Giuffrè, 1961), pp. 15-16, 31-32. 
12 It seems that the backwardness of the financial market in preindustrial China was due above all to 
the lack of state credit demand: see Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Bin Wong, ‘Another look at credit 
markets and investment in China and Europe before the industrial revolution’, mimeo, 2005. For the 
French case, Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Priceless Markets. The 
Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660-1870 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
13 See Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, Rosenthal, Priceless Markets, p. 289.   6
policy.
14 In principalities, however, major financiers – who managed the 
mechanism of taxation – enjoyed more advantages than small lenders. The 
former purchased from the latter their devaluated credits and then, counting 
on their influence at court and the treasury, were more successful in getting 
back money
15. 
  Venice and Genoa present the emergence of a precocious financial 
market of state credits. Some decades later, Florence followed the example 
of the two maritime cities, when in 1345 allowed the transferability of rights 
on Monte bonds in order to face creditors’ protest.
16 As far as the working 
of market is concerned, some common elements turn out. The bond trade 
was vivid and involved large sections of the population; middlemen took on 
an essential role to meet sellers and buyers, fixing the current price and thus 
leading the market movements; transactions had to be registered at the 
offices managing the debt. 
But differences were significant, indeed. Especially in the fifteenth 
century, the Florentine government appointed prominent people – bankers 
and merchants – as Monte officers who were expected to collect short-term 
loans, mostly from their network of relatives and friends. The principal was 
to be returned through the receipt of successive forced loans.17 It seems 
instead that the Genoese and Venetian governments did not use 
intermediaries between lenders and the treasury. Venetian bankers were 
called to anticipate money and pay on behalf of the government, but there is 
no evidence of their involvement in finding lenders.18 It is, however, not 
surprising that in these two cities there were no influential intermediaries. 
Particularly in Venice, the need to maintain equilibrium within the patriciate 
prevented the formation of powerful positions and, at least up to the 
fifteenth century, the wealth of individuals (and of their families) did not 
exert that influence that instead was to be found later. In fifteenth-century 
Venice, the ruling group was still constituted largely of merchants; the 
assignment to a few of them of the function of fundraisers would have been 
very risky, both in financial and political terms. In Florence, on the other 
hand, the ruling group was economically less homogeneous and, mainly 
                                                 
14 Heinrich Sieveking, Studio sulle finanze genovesi nel medioevo e in particolare sulla Casa di S. 
Giorgio (Genova: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1905), vol. 1, p. 206. 
15 Federico Chabod, Storia di Milano nell’età di Carlo V (Torino: Einaudi, 1971), pp. 353-54; and, for 
a later example, Rosario Villari, La rivolta antispagnola a Napoli. Le origini (1585-1647) (Roma-
Bari: Laterza, 1967), p. 148. 
16 On the misleading use of the term negotiability in the early phase of the Florentine Monte, see the 
subtle pages of Julius Kirshner, ‘Encumbering Private Claims to Public Debt in Renaissance 
Florence’, in Vito Piergiovanni (ed.), The Growth of the Bank as Institution and the Development of 
Money-Business Law (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1993), pp. 19-75. 
17 Goldthwaite, ‘Lorenzo Morelli’, pp. 605-33. Sergio Tognetti, Il banco 
Cambini. Affari e mercati di una compagnia mercantile-bancaria nella Firenze 
del XV secolo (Firenze: Olschki,1999), pp. 258, 261; Anthony Molho, 
Florentine Public Finances in the Early Renaissance, 1400-1433 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 153, 164, 170,176; Id., ‘Lo stato e 
la finanza pubblica. Un’ipotesi basata sulla storia tardomedievale di Firenze’, 
in Giorgio Chittolini, Anthony Molho and Pierangelo Schiera (eds), Origini 
dello stato. Processi di formazione statale in Italia fra medioevo e età moderna 
(Bologna: Il mulino, 1994), pp. 225-80. 
18 Reinhold C. Mueller, The Venetian Money Market. Banks, Panics and Public Debt, 1200-1500 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 425 sgg.   7
during the Medici age, was not very concerned with maintaining an 
apparent egalitarian structure. Likewise, in princely states the lord could 
count on some individuals to construct close relationships of reciprocal 
interest that linked the financial needs of the government to merchant 
lenders’ prospect of profit. Personal relations therefore prevailed in 
principalities, whereas in cities run by oligarchies the debt relied on a sort of 
impersonal market, where as a rule all creditors enjoyed the same rights and 
suffered the same damages. 
  It would, thus, seem reasonable to consider the urban means of 
indebtedness more dynamic and flexible than those of seigniorial and 
monarchic regimes, unable to develop financial innovations. This is true, but 
only partially. Beginning from the mid-fifteenth century, in fact, in both 
Naples and Rome the government attempted, although cautiously, to 
promote innovations. Alfonso V, in order to fund the war for the conquest of 
Naples, not only resorted to usual means (mortgages, bills of exchange) but 
also sought new ways. The liquidation of consistent loans was scheduled 
over a quite long period, so transforming short into long-term loans. The 
royal treasury, moreover, issued certificates of credit guaranteed on tax 
receipts; such credits could be transferred to creditors of merchants, who in 
turn had to get money from the treasury.
19 However, the continuous 
financial needs of the Aragonese foreign policy did not allow the 
establishment of the system and the emergence of a broad capital market. 
  In Rome on the contrary some financial innovations took up a firm 
feature and represented the base for further developments. Along with the 
traditional role of bankers, the popes had exploited the venality of offices, 
but from the pontificate of Sixtus IV (1471-84) the system began to show 
new characteristics, becoming a true financial device that released the office 
from any administrative duty. In 1486, for the first time this new charge was 
sold setting up up the so-called offices of third category. The purchaser of 
the office was to pay a given amount (the principal) and the government was 
to pay him a lifeterm ‘salary’ (the interest). Later it was allowed the transfer 
of the right to the ‘salary’ even upon the nominee’s death. In 1514, 
furthermore, the first societas officiurum was founded, that is a company 
constituted of people willing to invest in lifeterm (vacable) offices, but who 
individually could not purchase it.
20 The diffusion of government loans 
through offices brought about, according to Bauer, the ‘democratization of 
the papal state credit’.
21 The vacable offices actually enjoyed a large 
success. By 1520 the selling of third category offices had provided the papal 
coffers with an amount of 2.5 million ducats.
22 The success of the vacable 
                                                 
19 Ryder, ‘Cloth and credit’, pp. 12-13; Alfonso Silvestri, ‘Sull’attività bancaria napoletana durante il 
periodo aragonese’, Bollettino dell’Archivio Storico del Banco di Napoli, 6 (1953), pp. 87, 97. 
20 Fausto Piola Caselli, ‘Aspetti del debito pubblico nello stato pontificio: gli uffici vacabili’, Annali 
della Facoltà di Scienze Politiche dell’Università di Perugia, 11 (1970-72), pp. 3-74. For the decision 
to allow the constitution of investors’ companies, Walther v. Hofmann, Forschungen zur Geschichte 
der kurialen Behörden von Schisma bis zur Reformation (Rom: Loescher, 1914), vol. 1, pp. 188-89. 
21 Clemens Bauer, ‘Die Epochen der Papstfinanz. Ein Versuch’, Historische Zeitschrift, 138 (1928), 
p. 488. 
22 Felice Litva, ‘L’attività finanziaria della Dataria durante il periodo tridentino’, Archivum historiae 
pontificiae, 5 (1967), p. 135. Data on offices of third category sold between the fifteenth and sixteenth 
century in Piola Caselli, ‘Aspetti’, pp. 27, 30-31, 34.   8
offices over the sixteenth century is witnessed by their growing market 
price. 
 
Table 2: Prices of offices of third category at Rome, 1514-1590 
Constant price index (1514 = 100)  
 
Offices      1514  1525  1531  1565  1590 
 
Cubicolari        100 120 116 122 196 
Scudieri        100 103 105 151 256 
Collettori     100  103  95  57  70 
Giannizzeri     100  94  93  73  89 
Archivio        100 103 102 139 158 
Presidenti     100  92  99  108  104 
Porzionari     100  94  70  121  121 
 
Sources:  Bernhard Schimmelpfennig, ‘Der Ämterhandel an der römischen Kurie von Pius 
II. bis zum Sacco di Roma (1458-1527)’, in Ilja Mieck (ed.), Ämterhandel im 
Spätmittelalter und im 16. Jahrhundert, (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1984), pp. 39-41; 
Thomas Frenz, Die Kanzlei der Päpste der Hochrenaissance (1471-1527), (Tübingen: 
Niemeyer, 1986), pp. 204 ff.; Piola Caselli, ‘Aspetti’, pp. 40, 63-65. The silver content of 
currency has been used as deflator. 
 
Up to the middle of the century, prices did not significantly grow while later 
the market received offices warmly. The success of these investments, 
however, declined as the monti camerali appeared. The monti camerali were 
true bonds, sold by the Apostolic Chamber, which since the mid-sixteenth 
century broadly spread out and constituted the pillar of the papal debt up to 
the arrival of the Napoleonic troops. Over the seventeenth century, however, 
offices continued to play an important role as a means of credit among 
individuals.
23 
  In the early sixteenth century the interest rate of offices was around 
12%, in line with returns in other markets. It is worth noting that the papal 
choice to sell annuities – as was happening in early-sixteenth century 
Venice – was against the trend of other cases. In Bâle, for example, the city 








                                                 
23 Anna Esposito, ‘Note sulle societates officiorum alla corte di Roma nel pontificato di Sisto IV’, in  
Brigitte Flug, Michael Matheus and Andreas Rehberg (eds), Kurie und Region. Festschrift für Brigide 
Schwarz zum 65. Geburstag (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005), pp. 197-207; Renata Ago, Economia barocca. 
Mercato e istituzioni nella Roma del seicento (Roma: Donzelli, 1998), pp. 192-93; Ead., ‘Norme e 
regole: i ceti urbani davanti al notaio’, in Disuguaglianze: stratificazione e mobilità sociale nelle 
popolazioni italiane (dal sec. XIV agli inizi del secolo XX) (Bologna: Cleup, 1997), vol. 2, pp. 540-41. 
24 Hans-Jörg Gilomen, ‘La prise de décision en matière d’emprunts dans les villes suisses au XVe  
siècle’, in Marc Boone, Karel Davids and Paul Janssens (eds), Urban public debts. Urban government 
and the market for annuities in western Europe (14
th-18
th centuries) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), pp. 
137, 139.   9
How the market works 
 
In the cities, creditors were above all the inhabitants registered in the estimo 
and, particularly, those assessed above a given threshold of taxable wealth. 
Lending to the commune was considered a duty as much as servicing the 
urban militia. The option of borrowing therefore was not, at least initially, 
criticized; it reflected the choice to limit the use of direct taxation. The 
continuous resort to forced loans nevertheless raised critics and unrest. It 
was not an accident that in Florence, during the revolt of the Ciompi, claims 
of the rebels aimed to abolish loans carrying high interest rate as well as to 
resort to direct taxation.
25 In 1339, during one of the numerous riots that 
occurred in Genoa, the records of creditors were burnt; and in 1408 the 
same fate occurred to the first documents of the Casa di San Giorgio.
26 At 
the same time, the registers were important as proof of ownership of credits and 
served to support trust in the Monte, compere, and served to minimize fraud. 
  In many cases the duty to lend to the city government was, as 
already said, closely linked to the citizenship right. In the urban world of 
northern Italy, to be a citizen took on different meanings and involved 
different categories according to places and periods.
27 Not all the inhabitants 
of the city were considered citizens pleno iure, there were cives 
comitatenses, not to speak of the ‘originals’, who distinguished themselves 
from the ‘foreigners’. Citizenship created a specific relation between the 
inhabitants falling in the definition and the ruling elite. It was a sort of 
contract that was, on the one hand, to protect the citizens from the 
government’s abuses and, on the other hand, to guarantee a wide consent to 
the fiscal demand of authorities.
28 It is thus interesting to wonder whether 
the growing fiscal demand brought about a reconsideration of citizenship 
within the urban fabric. The authorities’ major concern was to identify the 
taxable citizens, without considering their local status. It was the payment of 
the taxes instead that actually sustained the legitimacy of applications for 
citizenship. If to defend homeland, as much with arms as money, was 
considered as the primary duty of the citizen, then the restless financial 
needs of the government pushed to widen the urban structure to be provided 
with some rights. 
  As far as foreigners are concerned, the statutes generally raised 
constraints to their purchase of state bonds. They could buy credits only 
upon the commune’s authorization. In Florence, for example, the law did 
                                                 
25 Roberto Barducci, ‘Le riforme finanziarie nel tumulto dei Ciompi’, in Il Tumulto dei Ciompi; Un 
momento di storia fiorentina ed europa (Firenze: Olschki, 1981), pp. 95-102. 
26 Sieveking, Studio sulle finanze,  p. 126; Steven A. Epstein, Genoa and the 
Genoese, 958-1528 (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1996), pp. 
204-5; Giorgio Felloni, ‘Introduzione’ to Giorgio Felloni (ed.), Inventario 
dell’Archivio del Banco di San Giorgio (1407-1805) (Roma: Ministero dei Beni 
Culturali, 1989), vol. 4, 1, p. 18 n. For a similar episode in Bâle, Gilomen, ‘La 
prise de décision’, p. 131. 
27 See the remarks of Julius Kirshner, ‘Civitas sibi faciat civem: Bartolus of Sassoferrato’s doctrine on 
the making of a citizen’, Speculum, 48 (1973), pp. 699-701; as well as Paolo Costa, Civitas. Storia 
della cittadinanza in Europa (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1999), vol. 1, pp. 14 sgg. 
28 I’m referring to the model put forward by Jan Luitev van Zanden and Maarten Prak, ‘Towards an 
Economic Interpretation of Citizenship: The Dutch Republic Between Medieval Communes and 
Modern-States’, in European Review of Economic History, 10 (2006), pp. 111-45.   10
not allow Florentines to sell their credits to foreigners, but in case of need 
the government called for also foreigners’ purses, though with caution.
29 In 
1415 the government opened the door to non-Florentine subscribers, but at 
the same time raised a tax of 10% on the amount being purchased. The tax 
was on the face value, usually much higher than the market price. This rule 
– sometime made flexible - however did not seem to have limited foreign 
capital supply. It is interesting to note that the government granted 
citizenship in order to draw foreign investors, who sometime enjoyed a 
higher interest rate than the usual one.
30 
  Borrowing from foreigners was not a matter to be trifled with. In 
exchange of an inflow of fresh money there might be the danger to create a 
too strong connection with the creditor, especially if the latter was a 
powerful person. In 1446 Florence, not having paid interest to the pope 
Eugenio IV’s Monte credits, had to face a reprisal, which was carried out by 
seizing goods of Florentine merchants in Rome and even imprisoning the 
ambassador Bernardino of Antonio de Medici.
31 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that in 1470, when the government reduced the interest rate on the 
Monte credits, the king of Portugal and several Genoese were excluded, just 
to avoid the threat of reprisals.
32 
  The institutionalization of the state debt brought about an important 
process of socialization of debt. The move from voluntary loans, addressed 
to a restricted group of people, to forced loans based on tax records and 
estimi represented a true innovation, not only in financial but also political 
and to some extent social terms.
33 Almost all the social groups in the main 
central-northern cities held or dealt with government bonds. The wide 
diffusion – particularly among artisans – of the Florentine debt, for example, 
during the revolt of the Ciompi prevented the government from reforming 
significantly the system of borrowing.
34 The registers of the Genoese debt 
witnessed a significant increase of the number of bondholders, from 1,773 
in 1392 to 11,315 in 1460 and a slight decline in 1500 with 9,997 
nominees.
35 One can argue that in the second half of the fifteenth century 
one fourth or one fifth of the urban population held credits of their 
                                                 
29 See, for example, Julius Kirshner, ‘Angelo degli Ubaldi and Bartolomeo da Saliceto on Priviliged 
Risk:  Investments of Luchino Novello Visconti in the Public Debt of (Monte Comune) of Florence’, 
Rivista internazionale di diritto comune, 14 (2003), pp. 83-117. 
30 Julius Kirshner, ‘Papa Eugenio IV e il Monte Comune. Documenti su investimento e speculazione 
nel debito pubblico di Firenze’, Archivio Storico Italiano, 127 (1969), pp. 341-43, 344. 
31 Ibid., p. 352. 
32 Heinrich Sieveking, Studio sulle finanze genovesi nel medioevo e in particolare sulla Casa di S. 
Giorgio (Genova: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1906), vol. 2, p. 29. 
33 See, for Florence, Roberto Barducci, ‘Politica e speculazione finanziaria a Firenze dopo la crisi del 
primo trecento (1343-1358)’, Archivio storico italiano, 137 (1979), p. 204. 
34 Gene Brucker, Dal comune alla signoria. La vita pubblica a Firenze nel primo rinascimento 
(Bologna: il Mulino, 1981), p. 61. By 1380 it seems that there were about 5,000 creditors. See also 
Renzo Ninci, ‘La politica finanziaria della Repubblica fiorentina dopo il Tumulto dei Ciompi (1380-
1425):  Un tentativo di “Programmazione”?’, in Renzo  Ninci (ed.), La società fiorentina nel Basso 
medioevo:  Per Elio Conti (Roma: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1995), pp. 151-167. 
35 Sieveking, Studio, vol. 1, pp. 205-6; Jacques Heers, Gênes au XVe siècle (Paris: Sevpen, 1961), p. 
175. It is intesting to recall that the British loan of 1694, which gave life to the Bank of England, was 
underwritten by 1,268 people: P. G. M. Dickson, The financial revolution in England. A study in the 
development of public credit 1688-1756 (Aldershot: Gregg Revivals, 1993
2), p. 254.   11
commune.
36 It must however be considered that if in the early phases the 
amount of subscribers increased, later it was to shrink.
37 The picture 
provided by the Florentine catasto of 1427 is eloquent. 
 
Table 3: The distribution of Monte credits in Florence in 1427 
  

















Source: David Herlihy, ‘Family and Property in Renaissance Florence’, in David Herlihy, 
Cities and Society in Medieval Italy (London: Variorum, 1980), p. 8 of the essay xiii. 
 
It is worth noting that in 1427 the Gini index of wealth concentration was 
78.75, while that of Monte credits was 89.67. Still, data of the catasto of 
1480 stress the close relation between wealth and Monte investments.
38 
Bonds were used in many ways, as the social base of citizens being 
involved in the system enlarged and the size of government indebtedness 
grew. Buying and selling was extremely important on the local credit 
market, favoring diffused speculative behaviors. These were behaviors that 
involved mainly medium and big creditors, whereas small bondholders 
tended to be quite passive.
39 Credits were used to pay taxes, so as to allow 
governments to withdraw a share of the debt by means of taxes. Because in 
                                                 
36 I have estimated the Genoese population in 1460 at 40,000 and in 1500 at 50,000: see Giuseppe 
Felloni, Scritti di storia economica (Genova: Società ligure di storia patria, 1999), vol. 2, pp. 1177-
1215. 
37 Unfortunately, there are only a few works, mostly on Florence, on this crucial aspect. Sieveking, 
Studio, vol. 1, p. 57; and Bernardino Barbadoro, Le finanze della repubblica fiorentina. Imposta 
diretta e debito pubblico fino all’istituzione del Monte (Firenze: Olschki, 1929), pp. 652-54, had 
noticed this phenomenon. For recent analyses see: Anthony Molho, ‘Créanciers de Florence en 1347. 
Un aperçu statistique du quartier de Santo Spirito’, in La Toscane et les Toscans autour de la 
Renaissance. Cadre de vie, société, croyances. Mélanges offerts à Charles-M. de La Roncière (Aix-
en-Provence: Publications de l’Université de Provence, 1999), pp. 79-93. 
38 Anthony Molho, Marriage alliance in late medieval Florence (Cambridge, Mass.  : Harvard 
University Press, 1994), pp. 80 ff. Data refers to the Dowry Fund. 
39 See Molho,’Créanciers de Florence’, pp. 83, 88  ; Juilis Kirshner and Jacob Klerman, ‘The 
sevenpercent fund of renaissance Florence’, in Banchi pubblici, banchi private e monti di pietà 
nell’Europa preindustriale. Amministrazione, tecniche operative e ruoli economici (Genova: Società 
ligure di storia patria, 1991), p. 396. Is is likely that in Venice and Genoa the upward concentration 
was lower than in Florence.   12
many cases tax farmers could pay a part of their lease through bonds and 
overdue interest, they helped to maintain the market lively
40. Bonds, 
furthermore, were widely used as surrogate of cash, to buy goods, to form 
dowries and to provide guarantees for further loans.
41  
The return provided by state credits depended of course on both the 
capacity of governments to pay regularly interest charges and the general 
economic atmosphere. Between the late fourteenth and the early fifteenth 
century, governments proved ever and ever unable to maintain their 
promises. As difficulties turned out, market prices of bonds steadily 




Source: Luciano Pezzolo, ‘Bonds and government debt in Italian city states, 1250-1650’, in 
Goetzman and Rouwenhorst (eds), Origins of Value, p 154. 
 
 
The restless devaluation of securities, however, forced Florence and Venice 
to launch new series, which had the aim to renew the relationship between 
state and taxpayers, who had to get cash, possibly by selling their state 
credits, so as to pay for new obligatory loans.  
                                                 
40 Sieveking, Studio sulle finanze, vol. 2, pp. 37-38; Marin Sanudo, Diari, ed. Rinaldo Fulin et alii, 58 
vols (Venezia: Deputazione di storia patria, 1879-1903), vol 52, col. 302. 
41 Much information can be drawn from Florentine material. See, for some examples, Ugolino di 
Niccolò Martelli, Ricordanze dal 1433 al 1483, ed. Fulvio Pezzarossa (Roma: Ed. di storia e 
letteratura, 1989); Francesco di Matteo Castellani, Ricordanze, ed. Giovanni Ciappelli (Firenze: 
Olschki, 1992) vol. 1; Giovanni Chellini da San Miniato, Le ricordanze, ed. Maria Teresa Sillano 
(Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1984). 
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The market witnessed remarkable variations according to the 
typology of bonds. If it is obvious that before the consolidation of the debt 
several credits were traded, characterized by the date of maturity and the 
taxes on which they relied, a relative heterogeneity persisted even after the 
unification of the series. In fifteenth-century Florence, along with the Monte 
commune bonds, were negotiated those of the Monte dei depositi (since the 
early century), those of the Monte di Pisa (since 1406), those of the Monte 
dei cinque interi (since 1424), those of the Monte dei Prestanzoni (since 
1425), those of the Monte delle doti (since 1425) as well as those of the 
Monte comune nuovissimo (since 1446).
42 In early sixteenth- century 
Venice, people could invest on bonds of the Monte vecchio, of the Monte 
nuovo (1482), of the Monte nuovissimo (1509), of the Monte sussidio 
(1526), and of the Depositi in zecca (since the 1520s).
43 So the choice was 
very wide, although destined to reduce, for bonds tended to adjust around 
one interest rate. Nevertheless it is wondering whether such menu was a 
feature of a developed credit market. According to Larry Neal, a wide 
supply of bonds would restrain the development of financial markets, in that 
it would bring about a limited homogeneity of conditions.
44 This would 
cause insufficient transparency and high transaction costs. In the Italian 
case, despite several issues, the market does not present a wide 
heterogeneity. Investors had a few choices and mostly linked to government 
credits. One could even argue that, within the context of both modest 
demand and restricted market, the position of the government was that of a 
monopsonist, with the attached advantages. 
A peculiar aspect of market concerned the negotiability of overdue 
interest (the so-called paghe). Since claims upon paghe fell due, they were 
negotiable, as much as the state securities. From the mid-fifteenth century, 
the Genoese government used to pay interest charges after at least four years 
since their maturity; in the meanwhile, creditors’ arrears were registered in 
special accounts of lire di paghe until they were paid.
45 The creation of the 
lire di paghe, whose value progressively increased as the maturity date got 
closer, institutionalized the system of arrears. It was thus created a market, 
which counted annually as much as 10,000 transactions,
46 based upon an 
intense speculation extremely sensitive to events.  It is noteworthy that in 
1506 a riot in Genoa was said to be provoked by shorters.  
  As far as credit market in principalities, it is not surprising that 
information is very scarce. As we have already seen, most of princes’ 
indebtedness relied on financial means related to trade, whose negotiability 
at least up through the fifteenth century was socially limited. A partial 
                                                 
42 See Elio Conti, L’imposta diretta a Firenze nel quattrocento (1427-1494) (Roma: Istituto Storico 
Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1984), pp. 30-31, 39, 128. 
43 Luciano Pezzolo, ‘The Venetian government debt, 1350-1650’, in Boone, Davids and Janssens 
(eds), Urban public debts, p. 62. 
44 Larry Neal, ‘How it all began: the monetary and financial architecture of Europe during the first 
global capital markets, 1648-1815’, Financial History Review, 7 (2000), pp. 117-40. 
45 Heers, Gênes, pp. 163 ff., 260-63; José-Gentil da Silva, ‘Le sconto à Gênes. A propos d’un 
croquis’, Annales, 13 (1958), pp. 150-53; and Julius Kirshner, ‘The Moral Problem of Discounting 
Genoese Paghe, 1450-1550’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 47 (1977), pp. 109-67. 
46 Heers, Gênes, p. 166.   14
exception is represented by Roman vacable offices, which were to some 
extent traded. 
  Buying and selling credits was generally made before a notary or a 
scribe of the office managing the debt, and registered on the books of the 
same office. Transaction costs were quite modest and of course were lower 
depending on the amount negotiated. In Genoa the shares (luoghi) sold were 
taxed with 20 soldi each, split equally between the buyer and the seller. To 
taxes one has to add the intermediation costs. Some operations of Paolo 
Guinigi, lord of Lucca from 1400 to 1430, on the Venetian market provide a 
good picture of the costs. The total of transaction costs proved to be 1.5% of 
the total amount, but most of the expenses were due to bills of exchange in 
order to get cash.
47 It is interesting to compare this percentage with those 
relating to other dealings. During the second half of the fourteenth century, 
only the tax on selling land in Florence withdrew 5%. Toward the mid-
fifteenth century, in Siena a similar tax was 3.3-3.5% of the declared value; 
while one had to pay on dowries 1.5% of the total amount.
48 In the 1760s, 
on the highly developed financial market of Amsterdam brokering costs 
accounted for 0.25% of the nominal value of obligations.
49 Such a 
comparison shows that state credits trading in Italy did not thus present high 
transaction costs, as a proof of the efficiency of the financial market. The 
role of middlemen (sensali) was crucial: intermediaries between demand 
and supply, they fixed the price according to news that diffused throughout 
a marked that presumably was restricted. In Venice everything occurred 
within an area circumscribed between Rialto, the financial heart of the city, 
and San Marco square. It is nonetheless worth stressing that the big limit of 
the Italian market – as elsewhere – was due to the fact that there were not 
bearer bonds.
50 There were actually several difficulties, both legal and 
practical, to protect the last creditor in case of default of his own debtor. A 
true large-scale innovation emerged during the second half of the sixteenth 
century in Antwerp, where in the local stock exchange several securities 
were negotiated, among which state bonds.
51 The negotiability, however, of 
state bonds was allowed in Holland only beginning from the mid-
seventeenth century.
52 In a restricted market such as the urban one, 
evidently, the transfer of bearer bond was not an urgent need. Governments 
                                                 
47 See data in Reinhold Mueller, ‘Foreign Investment in Venetian Government Bonds and the Case of 
Paolo Guinigi, Lord of Lucca, Early Fifteenth Century’, in Herman Diederiks and David Reeder 
(eds), Cities of finance (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1996), 
p. 82. 
48 Il libro di ricordanze dei Corsini (1362-1457), ed. by Armando Petrucci, (Roma: Istituto Storico 
Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1965), pp. 7-8, 62, 113; Balestracci, La zappa, p. 143. 
49 Oscar Gelderblom and Joost Jonker, ‘Probing a Virtual Market. Interest Rates and the Trade in 
Government Bonds in the Dutch Republic’, paper presented at the seminar on The Origins and 
Development of Financial Markets and Institutions, Urbana (Ill.), April 27-29, 2006, p. 20. See also 
Wantije Fritschy, ‘A “Financial Revolution” Reconsidered: Public Finance in Holland During the 
Dutch Revolt, 1568-1648’, Economic History Review, 56 (2003), p. 64. 
50 Some examples in John Munro, ‘The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution: Usury, Rentes, 
and Negotiability’, International History Review, 25 (2003), pp. 505-615. 
51 Ibid.; Hermann van der Wee, The Low Countries in the early modern world (Aldershot: Variorum, 
1993), pp. 145 ff. 
52 Gelderblom and Jonker, ‘Probing a virtual market’.   15
were concerned more with identifying and finding the effective bondholders 





The forced loans system de facto circumvented a crucial point, namely the 
need of robust constraints that compelled governments to fulfill their 
creditors. It is therefore inopportune to define such a system as a true public 
debt because, among other things, the voluntary character of investment was 
lacking.
53 For foreign investors instead the picture is different. Their 
investments were voluntary and their amount reflected on the one hand the 
degree of reliability governments enjoyed in markets and on the other the 
capability of ensuring high returns to investors on the secondary market. 
  As far as citizens are concerned, the announcement that given tax 
receipts were earmarked to paying interest represented an important 
element, even if not crucial. Credibility probably depended on both 
government’s reputation and, above all, the heavy involvement of the ruling 
group as state creditors. It was the case of Venice, where several members 
of the patriciate held wide shares of debt.
54 Genoese investors relied on 
guarantees much more effectively than elsewhere. Beginning from 1407 the 
foundation of the Casa di San Giorgio – that is a consortium of creditors of 
the government - allowed a close control over state finance and debt 
management. This semi-private institution played a central role in state 
financing, heavily influencing the government’s policy. The collaboration 
between the powerful representatives of the Casa and the government 
provides a excellent example of how the whole power of proxy to the Casa 
for managing the state finance allowed the commune to collect enormous 
amounts of money at low cost. The same principle (the responsibility of a 
group in creditors for paying their interest from tax receipts) will be found 
in sixteenth-century Rome and, with much more modest results, in Francis 
I’s Paris.
55 
  The key feature that underpinned the system and above all supported 
a vivid and large market – which in turn called for a certain degree of 
credibility – laid in the close permeation between major bondholders and 
power elite. As long as this identity subsisted it would have been unlikely 
the government defaulted. The success and efficiency of government debt in 
the Italian city-states would not be as much the natural outcome of the 
republican institutional structure (as opposed to princely states) as the result 
of a power system that took advantage from the mechanism of state 
indebtedness in a rather limited context. If this hypothesis is plausible, it is 
                                                 
53 Pezzolo, The Venetian government debt, p. 67. The coercive character of Genoese loans, however, 
is not always evident. 
54 Unfortunately quantitative data are lacking, but it suffices to look through Gino Luzzatto’s, 
‘Introduzione’ to I prestiti, and Mueller, The Venetian money market, to get some evidence. 
55 For a comparison between the two systems, Luciano Pezzolo, ‘Government Debts and Trust. 
French Kings and Roman Popes as Borrowers, 1520-1660’, Rivista di Storia Economica, 15 (1999), 
pp. 233-61. A revaluation of the royal bonds is put forward by Mathilde Moulin, ‘Les rentes sur 
l’hôtel de ville de Paris sous Louis XIV’, Histoire, Economie, Société, 17 (1998), pp. 623-48.   16
then necessary to reconsider the classic model put forward by North and 
Weingast.
56 
  It is well known that the two scholars argued a close relation 
between the institutional dynamics in early eighteenth-century England and 
the emergence of a modern and advanced financial market. In short, as the 
parliament took on the whole political power after the Glorious Revolution 
the road would have paved to funding the debt, with the resulting decline of 
interest rate and development of the financial market. All that was due to the 
credibility of  the parliament as a debtor and above all as unique responsible 
of fiscal policy as well as a more effective enforcement of property rights. 
The thesis of North and Weingast had a large impact and prompted to put 
institutions, the financial sector and the legal context at the heart of the 
debate on the economic development.
57 Recent critics, however, have 
stressed that the Glorious Revolution did not represent a turning point 
concerning property rights nor determined a such dramatic change in the 
trend of interest rate.
58 It was furthermore argued that interest rate variations 
show on the contrary a significant relation with the turnover of parties (Tory 
and Whig) in power.
59 The link between efficiency of public debt and 
constitutional power would therefore seem quite weak. It would instead be 
important to look at the fiscal system: it seems in fact that there is a positive 
relation between the width of representative institutions and tax efficiency.
60 
Some scholars argue that the power of the English state laid first of all in its 
capability to borrow thanks to its tax resources. Likewise a similar model 
has been put forward for Holland.
61 Let us try to apply, though briefly, this 
hypothesis to the Italian case. 
  In order to compare the different cases interest rates will be 
examined, which can after due consideration be considered as ‘the most 
evident quantitative dimension of the efficiency of the institutional 
framework’.
62 It is manifest that republican governments paid for loans less 
                                                 
56 Douglass C. North, Barry R. Weigast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment: the Evolution of 
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’, Journal of Economic History, 
49 (1989), pp. 803-32. 
57 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘Legal 
Determinants of External Finance’, Journal of Finance, 52 (1997), pp. 1131-50. 
58 Gregory Clark, ‘The Political Foundations of Modern Economic Growth: Britain, 1540-1800, 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 26 (1996), pp. 563-88; Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh, 
Constitutions and Commitment: Evidence on the Relation Between Institutions and the Cost of 
Capital, Cepr Discussion Paper, n. 4404, June 2004. 
59 David Stasavage, Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State. France and Great Britain, 
1688-1789 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 68 ff.; but see also Bruce G. 
Carruthers, Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996); Avinash Dixit and John Londregan, ‘Political Power and the Credibility of Government 
Debt’, Journal of Economic Theory, 94 (2000), pp. 80-105. 
60 Philip T. Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg (eds), Fiscal crises, liberty, and representative 
governments 1450-1789 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
61 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (New York: 
Knopf, 1989); Patrick K. O’Brien, ‘The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660-1815’, 
Economic History Review, 41 (1988), pp. 1-32; Fritschy, ‘A “Financial Revolution”’, pp. 57-89. 
62 Douglass C. North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 69.   17
than kings and princes. It is necessary to ask why.
63 First of all, lords look to 
be scarcely reliable debtors and consequently they have to pay a high-risk 
premium. Monarchs did not actually present credible commitments to 
lenders. The only risk was due to the eventual bad reputation that had been 
forming over the past. It is not simple to compare interest paid by republics 
with that of principalities’. Market conditions were different. Princes, on the 
one hand, negotiated loans according to certain elements (power relations, 
patronage, guarantees, capital availability), republics on the other hand 
resorted mainly to forced loans, at lower interest than that of market. It is 
therefore necessary to examine voluntary loans raised by republican 
governments. When Florence’s treasury needed cash it resorted to 
professional financiers’ services. In the Arno city bankers were, as it is well 
known, not short and it is not surprising to find them within the mechanism 
of state financing.
64 But that means that public borrowing was dear, and 
sometimes dearer than in the private market. Some data, although scanty, 
are worth being considered. 
Figure 2














Sources: Barbadoro, Le finanze della repubblica, pp. 534 sgg.; Armando Sapori, Studi di 
storia economica, 3rd edn (Firenze: Sansoni, 1982), vol. 1, p. 197. Interest rates are on 
medium and long term loans. 
 
Of course one has to consider that high government rates correspond to 
periods of severe need, due to political and military factors. Let us, 
however, make some consideration, albeit forcibly provisional. The 
                                                 
63 See the data published by Stephan R. Epstein, Freedom and Growth. The Rise of States and 
Markets in Europe, 1300-1750 (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 20-23; and the discussion of David 
Stasavage, ‘Cities, Constitutions, and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274-1785’, mimeo 2005. 
64 Molho, Florentine public finances, p. 164.   18
consolidation of the mid-1340s did not provide great relief to communal 
coffers. In the 1350s and 1360s the high interest rate promised (a nominal 
5% on a nominal principal twice or three times as much that effectively 
paid) shows how it was hard to collect money from voluntary lenders. The 
spread however, which could be considered as the risk premium paid by the 
government, was not usually large. This meant that a certain confidence, 
difficulties notwithstanding, was widespread among investors. It cannot be 
denied that in Florence money was largely diffused and that sophisticated 
financial techniques and skill helped maintain the money cost quite 
moderate. A further element worth stressing concerns the interest rate trend. 
In this case it seems that government interest rate had driven the market 
movement, increasing also those among individuals. It remains to account 
for the influence of declining government yield on private credit market.
65 
       It is worth stressing a further crucial element. Beginning from the mid-
fourteenth century, tax pressure increased, just as the funded debt system 
was created and the aggressive expansion of the Florentine state took place. 
The growth of indebtedness was actually backed by tax receipts: both 
sustained each other to provide the commune with resources necessary to 






In late-medieval Western Europe some differences turned out, 
characterizing the system of indebtedness of urban communities. There 
were, on the one hand, Mediterranean cities, which resorted to forced loans 
mainly through fiscal records and, on the other hand, there were cities in 
northern France and Flanders that since the thirteenth century sold annuities 
to finance their deficit. These annuities were bought also in other markets 
and had the character of life annuities.
67 It is worth stressing this element. In 
northern Europe, from France to Switzerland, life annuities enjoyed large 
success, at least up to the early sixteenth century, but in Italy they were not 
widely used. It is very likely that Italian governments were aware of such 
financial devices: several merchants acted in French and Flemish cities and 
so it would be easier to get information. Issuing annuities was not a mere 
trifle. In order to take profit, the government had to exploit statistical and 
actuarial knowledge, which were not simple and were to develop starting 
from the seventeenth century.
68 The advantage that these annuities were 
                                                 
65 Bruno Dini, Manifattura, commercio e banca nella Firenze medievale (Firenze: Nardini, 2001), p. 
94, argues that Monte loans had a pegging effect on private market. 
66 Marvin B. Becker ‘Economic Change and the Emerging Florentine Territorial 
State’,  Studies in the Renaissance, 13 (1966), pp. 7-39; Id., ‘Problemi della 
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Quattrocento’, Archivio Storico Italiano, 123 (1965), pp. 433-66. 
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self-liquidating was not probably offset by the great uncertainty stirring over 
life annuities. By the late fifteenth and particularly the early sixteenth 
century, some Italian governments begun to issue life annuities, maybe 
because of their severe financial needs. In some cases it was these very 
annuities that paved the way to a true primary state bonds market, as in 
Rome and Venice. 
        After all one can argue that the indebtedness mechanisms of western 
Mediterranean cities were not very different. Loans issued by Valencia or 
Barcelona had much in common with Florentine or Venetian loans. Rather, 
in the Aragonese territories it appears missing the character strongly 
forcible, which instead is to be found in Italy. In the Peninsula, lending to 
governments is not as much an investment choice as a duty of taxpayers. 
Accordingly, the problem of credibility of institutions did not play a 
significant role. It would however be wrong to deny some innovations that 
had been occurring in northern Italy, namely the emergence of a vivid 
secondary market of state bonds. The turn over of bonds was quite fast, 
arguing an annual rate of change of 5% of the nominal amount.
69 The 
secondary market allowed to liquidate credits in case of need; furthermore it 
offered attractive chances of speculation on both bonds themselves and 
overdue interest. These speculations nevertheless did not seem to 
characterize the practice in the main Italian market – with the exception of 
Genoa – due to the tiny size of commercial credit and the conservative 
behavior of bondholders.
70 The presence of state credits became ever and 
ever consistent in the assets of noble families and of religious and charity 
institutions. These were categories that by definition do not follow 
speculative behaviors. A dynamic secondary market was the product of at 
least two elements: on the one hand, creditors-taxpayers, and particularly 
the less well-off, were compelled to sell their credits to face the 
government’s growing demand for further loans and, on the other hand, 
buyers were attracted by the high profitability of credits and the belief that 
the government would keep its promises. The credibility of government 
institutions therefore dealt with speculators in the secondary market. But 
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